国际清算银行:什么时候更少更多?银行流动性安排与央行支持(英文版)
国际清算银行:什么时候更少更多?银行流动性安排与央行支持(英文版).pdf |
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Theory suggests that in the face of fire-sale externalities, banks have incentives to overinvest in order to issue cheap money-like deposit liabilities. The existence of a private market for insurance such as contingent capital can eliminate the overinvestment incentives, leading to efficient outcomes. However, it does not eliminate fire sales. A central bank that can infuse liquidity cheaply may be motivated to intervene in the face of fire sales. If so, it can crowd out the private market a
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